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ABSTR<\CT 
What to do with CRP contracts as they expire is one of the most pressing issues 
confronting U.S. agricultural policymakers in 1995. Because CRP renewal will compete in 1995 
with other agricultural programs for funding. greater attention will be paid to improved targeting 
of payments to maintain a significant portion of existing environmental and farm benefits at a 
reduced program cost. We consider three alternative renewal criteria: (I) renewal of least 
expensive land first (cost-ranking). (2) renewal of most environmentally sensitive land first 
(benefit-ranking). and (3) rene\val of land according to the cost per unit of environmental benefit 
offered (cost/benefit-ranking). Environmental indicators used to measure benefits include sheet 
and rill erosion. wind erosion. surface \Vater quality. ground\vater vulnerability to pesticide 
leaching. \vildlife habitat. and an aggregate of the five individual indicators. Measures of these 
environmental attributes currently enrolled CRP land are from the 1992 National Resources 
Inventory. Estimates ofthe trade-offs between the number of acres enrolled in CRP and the level 
of specific environmental benefits from targeting environmental indicators for various limits on 
annual government expenditures are provided. We show that the degree of conflict between 
maximizing CRP acreage and maximizing environmental benefit is determined by the moments 
o rjoint distribution of land opportunity costs and land characteristics. In particular we show that 
contlicts increase as (1) land rental rates and the level of environmental benefits offered by 
1ndividual tracts of CRP land become rr:.orc positively correlated and (2) the distribution of 
environmental benefits across CRP land becomes less uniformly distributed. We estimate that 
rene\ving 49 percent of CRP acreage could provide 72 percent of aggregate environmental 
benefits while reducing costs by 55 percent. Greater cost savings will result. so policymakcrs 
want to target one or two specific environmental benefits. 
THE ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF A TARGETED 
RENKWAL OF CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM CONTRACTS 
Determining the best way to achieve multiple benefits from a renev,·al ofthe 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is perhaps the most pressing policy issue that Congress 
will resolve in the 1995 farm Bill. Support for a renewal is widespread because both farmers 
and the environment benefit from CRP. Environmental benefits include reducing soil erosion, 
increasing \Vater quality, and enhancing \Vildlife habitat. Farmers benefit from supply reductions 
and direct rental payments offered by CRP. In 1995, CRP renewal will compete with other 
agricultural programs for funding, so greater attention will be paid to improved targeting of 
pay·ments to maintain a significant portion of existing environmental and farm benefits at a 
reduced program cost. But the question of vihat should be targeted is open given the many 
benefits of CRP. 
Previous analyses of CRP efficiency have demonstrated that specific CRP benefits could 
have been achieved at a lower cost. Heimlich and Osborn estimate that it would cost $0.54 per 
ton to save soil in a five million acre CRP renewal if maximum soil erosion were targeted. 
compared with a cost of $1.01 per ton if renewal were based on minimizing rental cost. 
Reichelderfer and Boggess demonstrate that the cost per ton for reducing erosion could be 
decreased by 15 percent if erosion benefits were maximized. They also estimate that the amount 
of supply control benefits would increase by 13 percent if supply control had been targeted. 
Ribaudo shmvs hmv net water quality benefits from CRP land enrolled after the seventh sign-up 
in 1988 could have been increased by better targeting, particularly if the economic benefits of 
improved \Vater quality were included. 
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A critical factor in determining the political optimality of a policy that targets a single 
objective is the extent to which other objectives are also achieved. Reichelderfer and Boggess 
show that there arc significant trade-offs among the objectives of maximizing erosion benefits. 
supply control benefits. and the amount of acreage enrolled in CRP. Ribaudo reports that there is 
a significant trade-offbet\veen wind and \Vater erosion in current CRP land because land 
vulnerable to wind erosion is not vulnerable to \Vater erosion. Both Reichelderfer and Boggess 
and Ribaudo conclude that the characteristics of land initially enrolled arc consistent with a CRP 
objective of maximizing the number of acres enrolled, rather than maximizing some 
cm·ironmental benefit or the amount of supply control offered by CRP. 
In this paper vvc consider the benefit tradc-offs under alternative CRP renewal policies. 
We demonstrate that the magnitude oftl1c trade-offs between maximizing CRP acreage and 
maximizing environmental and supply control benefits is determined by the moments of the joint 
distribution of land opportunity costs and land characteristics. We estimate the extent to which 
the multiple CRP benefits are achieved under alternative renewal criteria and for varying budget 
constraint scenarios. The alternative rene\val criteria include: (1) renew least expensive lands 
first: (2) renevv most environmentally sensitive lands first; and (3) renew lands to maximize 
environmental benefits. Six indicators measure environmental benefits including water erosion. 
wind erosion. groundwater vulnerability to pesticide leaching. surface water quality, wildlife 
habitat potentiaL and an aggregate index that is a simple linear aggregate of the five individual 
indicators. 
\Ve describe how we constructed the five environmental benefit indexes. present the 
distribution of environmental benefits and enrollment costs of current contracts, and analyze the 
e~tent to vvhieh efficiency can be increased by targeting. We discuss data and estimation 
procedure and report estimates of the percentage gains in efficiency under alternative targeting 
policies and scenarios. 
Target Indicators 
The indicators selected for targeting CRP renewal to achieve greater environmental 
benefits, as indicated by multiple media (soil/water/wildlife habitat). may be classified into four 
broad categories: erodibility, ground\vater quality, surface water quality, and wildlife habitat 
potential. More specifically, soil erosion from \Vind and water, groundwater vulnerability to 
pesticide leaching. surface water quality measured indirectly by the nearness of CRP to surface 
\Vater bodies, and a potential \vildlife habitat index were selected as the indicators for targeting 
CRP lands. 
The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) was used in estimating water erosion (sheet 
and rill erosion) (USDA 1978). The wind erosion estimates are the average annual soil loss as 
estimated by the vvind erosion equation. A detailed explanation of factors entering the wind 
erosion equation is available in USDA 1988. Both \vind and water erosion estimates used for 
targeting are the preenrollment values for the NRI point that is contracted under CRP. We use 
preenrollment rather than postenrollment estimates to indicate the likely erosion levels if the land 
\vere returned to production. 
The groundwater vulnerability index (GWV index) for pesticide leaching arc obtained 
from Kellogg eta!. 1992. The GWV index is a function of soil leaching potential, pesticide 
leaching potentiaL precipitation, and chemical use. The GWV index can only provide relative 
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measures ofthc risk ofshallovv groundwater contamination bv chemicals used in agriculture. It 
~ - ~ 
represents an extension to the national level of the State Pesticide Interaction Screening 
Procedure. Chemical use at each NRI point was inferred based on the crop grovvn and the crop 
specific chemical use assembled by Resources for the Future (RFF). The G WV index is based 
on the 1982 pesticide use and cropping patterns. 
At present there is no direct or relative measure of risk to surf~1cc water from agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution at the national level. Therefore. \Ve usc the distance of a given NRI 
point from surface water bodies as a rough indicator of surface water quality (SWQ index). It is 
well documented that the closer cropland is to a surface water body the greater the chance of 
contamination from agricultural chemicals and soil sediment from field runoff. For example. the 
establishment of riparian buffer strip around water bodies buffers the zone between cropland and 
surface \Vater, thereby reducing pollution caused by field runoff. The distance variable in the 
National Resource InvelJtory (NRI 1992) database measures actual distance (in feet) from the 
surface \Vater body. 
We constructed an index by assigning scores based on distance, d. from the surface \Vater 
body: S\VQ index= 100 ifd < 100 feet; SWQ index= 64 ifthe distance is between 100 feet and 
165 feet: SWQ index= 32 if the distance is greater than 165 feet but less than 1116 mile: SWQ 
index = 16 if the distance is between 111 6 and 1/8 mile: S WQ index= 8 if the distance is 
between 1/8 and 1/4 mile: and SWQ index= 0 ifd > 1/4 mile. The NRI collects and reports 
distances of 1/4 mile and less. 
Sitc-speci fie ecological studies have shown that CRP has improved the abundance and 
distribution of wildlife habitat. Reproductive success of upland nesting species of waterfowl 
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such as mallard and blue-winged teal has been greater on CRP land than on cropped !add 
(Kantrud 1993~ Best et al. 1994). It is the general perception of wildlife biologists and ecologists 
that management decisions favoring species suited for expansive tracts of grass/hayland may 
cont1ict with those intended for species endemic to agricultural production landscapes. 1 Wildlife 
biologists and ecologists are quick to point out that critical \vildlifc habitat cast of the Mississippi 
Ri\·er differs from that west ofthe Mississippi. 
East of the Mississippi, riparian land and wetlands are the critical wildlife habitat. Thus. 
\\e assign a value of 100 to CRP land within 100 feet of water bodies and to CRP land classified 
as wetlands. For CRP land farther than 100 feet from the surface water body the same discrete 
score as that of the surface water quality index \Vas used. Even though land more than 1,320 feet 
away from a v..ater source has some riparian value, the maximum distance reported in the NRI 
data is 1.320 feet. 
For regions west of the Mississippi, both riparian lands and grasslands enhance the 
wildlife habitat. Values for wildlife habitat \vest of the Mississippi should compare with the 
index values for land east of the Mississippi. Riparian lands and wetlands west of the 
Mississippi have the same scores as those for land east of the Mississippi. To target grasslands 
\Vest of the Mississippi, a score of 10 was assigned to all grasslands. 
In addition to the specific environmental indicators targeted to protect soil, wateL and 
wildlife habitat resources. a cumulative environmental benefits index (henceforth referred to as 
multiple index) was constructed as: 
"\full iple Index = f (water!'vvind erosion. ground/surface v,·ater quality. wildli{e habitat). 
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Since the units of measurement as well as the range of each of these indicators are substantially 
different. we normalized them to a scale ofO to 100. The ranking ofCRP land for targeting 
under any given indicator is based on this normalized score. The specific equation used in 
constructing the multipie index is 
Afultiple Index = fiJ * Water Erosion+ Ji2 * Wind Erosion +j) 3 * GTVV Index + 
fl..;.* SWQ Index+ jJ5 * WLH Index 
where/)i is the weight assigned to each target indicator. Here we have assumed all target 
indicators are equally important; therefore, a value of 1 is assigned to eachfli. Alternatively, if 
the decision maker can assign different weights to these indicators or prefers a multiplicative 
relationship, then the multiple index can be constructed accordingly. Targeting CRP land for 
cumulative environmental benefits is bc:sed on the linear multiple index shown above. 
Distribution of Current CRP Land 
About 34 million acres ofU.S. cropland were enrolled in the CRP through the eleventh 
sign-up in 1991, at an annual cost of $1.67 billion and an average annual rental value of $49 per 
acre. Table 1 presents the distribution of CRP acres and total annual rental cost in the ten LSDA 
L1.rm production regions. Appendix B tables shovv the distribution ofCRP land by USDA 
regions and specific environmental indicators used in this analysis. Appendix C contains maps 
that illustrate the locations of CRP land and different relevant characteristics at the county level. 
!\scan be seen in Table 1, the Corn Belt Lake States, Northern and Southern Plains, and 
Mountain regions accounted for more than 85 percent of the cost and acres enrolled under CRP. 
The "\iorthern Plains alone accounted for nearly 25 percent oftotal CRP acres. Average rental 
rable I. Distribution of CRP acres, total and average rental payments, and total sni l loss by USDA reg1on 
Total Sui I Loss a 
Iota! CRP Total Rent Average Rent Pre Post Soil Savings Erosion Rate 
USDA 
Region acres percent dollars percent dollars per acre tons Pre/Post tons per acre 
Northeast 201.500 0 60 II ,965,236 0.72 59.38 2,773,475 234,859 11.8 13.76 
Appalachian I ,074,700 3.19 58,083.098 3.48 54.05 29,409,610 I ,584,203 18.6 27.37 
Southeast I ,522, I 00 4.52 64,882,210 3.88 42.63 23,622,095 I ,698,329 13.9 15.52 
De Ita States 1,142,300 3.39 50,603,437 3.03 44.30 21,132,020 1,500,779 14.1 18.50 
Corn I3elt 5,125,500 15.21 379,131,181 22.68 73.97 97,183,476 6,128,435 15.9 18.98 
Lake States 2,718,200 8.07 160,554,818 9.61 59.07 45,528,187 3,280,630 13.9 16.75 
N. Plains 8,824,200 26.19 408,829,844 24.46 46.33 150,419,720 13,150,411 l 1.4 17.05 
S. Plains 5,129,300 15.22 205,629,638 12.30 40 09 177,090,359 l 0,148,542 17.4 34.53 
Mountain 6,246,200 18.54 247,031,124 14.78 39.55 \33,171,578 13,229,226 10.1 21.32 
Pacific l ,706.000 5 06 84,598,736 5.06 49.59 23,893,035 2,255,665 10.6 14.01 
National 33,690,000 100 1,671,309,322 100 49.61 704,223,554 53,211,079 13.2 20.90 
Note: CRP enrollment through the eleventh sign-up is included (end of 1991 ). 
aTotal soil loss is from sheet and rill erosion and wind erosion. 
bPreenrollment 
CPostenrollment 
Source: National Resources Inventory database from USDA/SCS 1992 
8 
cost per acre of CRP land ranged from $39 in the Mountain region to $74 in the Corn Belt. To 
indicate the magnitude of environmental benefits derived from CRP, Table 1 also shows that 
total annual soil loss from both sheet and rill erosion was reduced from 700 million tons to 53 
million tons on the 34 million acres in 1992. 
Figure 1 shovvs the three categories of established cover on CRP acres. Nationwide, 89 
percent of CRP land has grass/legume cover. 7. 7 percent has tree cover. and the remaining 3 
percent was designated as a wildlife component. Evaluating the distribution of CRP acres among 
land capability classes (LCC)2 indicates whether the program idles marginal land or more 
productive land (Figure 2). Land capabqity classes 4 to 8 are considered less productive than 1 
to 3. The economic and environmental benefits from idling marginal land are significant if 
farmers apply more inputs to their marginal land than their more productive land. Nationwide 
i.CC·' 
Figure 1. Established cover on CRP land Figure 2. Land capability class on CRP land 
1 '3 of CRP land belonged to the land capability classes 4 to 8 and the remaining 2/3 were in 
categories 1 to 3. 
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Distribution of CRP land according to pre- and postenrollment levels of sheet and rill 
erosion is estimated (see Table B.l ). Nearly 41 percent of CRP land had an average annual 
erosion (sheet and rill) of more than 20 tons per acre. Distribution of CRP land according to 
\vind erosion rates is shown in Table 8.2. The most wind erosive land is in the Great Plains and 
Mountain regions. About 27 percent of CRP land is within a 1/4 mile of a surhlce \Vater body 
(Table B.3). The Northeast, the Southeast and the Mid\vest had more than 50 percent of CRP 
land within a 1/4 mile of a surface water body. 
CRP land was grouped into no-, lmv~, medium-, and high-risk classes for ground 
vulnerability to pesticide leaching as defined by Kellogg et al. (1992) (Table 8.4). The high-risk 
land has a groundwater vulnerability score of 124 and above, medium-risk has a score or 30 to 
124. and lmv-risk has a score of 0.1 to 30. Only about 17 percent of total CRP land is estimated 
to be in the high-risk class. This is not surprising because initial CRP enrollment targeted 
erosive land with high runoff potential. Thus. the leaching potential of this land is limited. 
Efficiency Gains from Targeting 
More precise targeting of CRP payments can increase the efficiency of meeting some 
social objective. The trade-offs involved \vhen moving from an objective of maximizing total 
CRP acreage to a program that directly targets some benefit offered by the CRP land are 
examined. The targeted program will select land to enroll based on some attribute other than 
cost of the land. Land \viii be enrolled until a budget constraint, which \ve denote as TC*, is 
achieved. Let C denote the per acre annual cost of land. C0 :::; C:::; C1• and B the per acre annual 
targeted benefit offered. B0 :::; B:::; B1. Denote the joint density function of Band Cas s(C.B) 
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This joint density function can measure the share of land with desired attributes. For example, 
the share of current CRP land with C 1 s C s C;; is given by 
lit c·i! f f s( C, B)dCdB. 
R0 C" 
A targeted or selective rene\val of CRP contracts corresponds to selecting a subset of the 
(·and 13 values. For example, policymakers may want to renew only CRP land with C s C, and 
B ~ 8,. Under this targeting scheme, the size of CRP, total annual CRP payment, and total 
environmental benefits are 
C.,BJ 
TA(C. B,) ~c TAo J js(C, B)dBdC. (1) 
C0 n, 
(',I! 1 
TC((', .. B) c~ TAo J fs(C, B)CdBdC. (2) 
Co /j, 
(', llJ 
TB(C,, B,) ~TAo I I s(C, B)BdBdC, (3) 
C,l H, 
where TA 0 is the total acreage of current CRP land. Reichelderfer and Boggess conclude that 
the characteristics of land initially enrolled are most consistent with a CRP objective of 
maximizing the number of acres enrolled. An alternative targeting scheme will trade decreases 
in 7>1 for increases in TB and hold TC constant. 
Maximizing CRP acreage is accomplished by ranking CRP tracts from low to high 
~ 
according to C and accepting bids until the total rental cost equals the budget constraint, TC ; 
in other words. the least expensive land is renewed first. The highest bid accepted under this 
* targeting scheme. C , is defined by 
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* * TC(C, B0) = TC 0 (4) 
Total acreage and total benefits from this targeting scheme are 
(5) 
* * TBdTC) = TB(C, B0). (6) 
An alternative targeting scheme is to rank land from high to low according to B: that is. 
the most environmentally sensitive land is renewed first. The smallest per acre benefit 
* accepted under this targeting scheme, B , is defined by 
* * TC(C1, B) = TC 0 (7) 
Total acreage of CRP land and the total environmental benefit from this targeting scheme 
equal 
(8) 
(9) 
The last targeting scheme takes into account both costs and benefits, ranking land from 
low to high according to the marginal cost of providing B, which is measured by the ratio CIB. 
Here the land that provides an additional unit of environmental benefit at least cost is renewed 
* first. The highest marginal cost under this targeting scheme, MC, is defined by 
* * TC(C1, C/MC) = TC. (10) 
Total acreage and the total benefit from this targeting scheme equal 
* * TA 3(TC) = TA(C1, C/MC ), (11) 
* * TB 3(TC) = TB(C1, C/MC ). (12) 
TB ,(TC0), where TC0 is the current total annual CRP payment, which implies that if the budget 
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constraint is set high enough to renew all CRP acres, all three targeting schemes yield the 
same acreage and benefits. However. when the budget constraint is binding, these targeting 
schemes lead to different outcomes. Differentiating (4) through (12) shows that when total 
expenditures are reduced, total acreage and total benefits are reduced at different rates under 
the three targeting schemes: 
* * dTA/dTC = IIC, 
dTA:/dTC~ = 1/E(C/ B=B'), * "' * dTB/dTC = B IE(CI B=B ), (13) 
dTA 3/drc* = 1/E(CI CIB=MC*), dTB/dTC* = 1/MC*, 
where the expectations are appropriately defined conditional expectations. Before analyzing 
these derivatives further, Proposition 1 establishes some basic relationships between acreage 
and benefits under the three targeting schemes and will be referred to as C-ranking, B-ranking. 
and C!B-ranking. 
Proposition 1. 
* * * * TB 3(TC) ~ TBJTC ), and TB3(TC) ~ TB2(TC ). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 simply establishes that acreage is maximized if land is accepted according 
to cost (C) and benefits are maximized if land is accepted according to marginal cost (CIB). 
(See Appendix A for a complete proof.) The marginal cost targeting scheme results in greater 
acreage and benefits than if land is ranked by B. Note that maximizing acreage may also 
result in greater total benefits than the B-ranking. Insight into the factors that determine the 
magnitude of the acreage and benefit trade-offs from the ranking schemes can be obtained 
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from the derivatives in (13). Acreage and benefit outcomes from the C-ranking scheme and 
the B-ranking scheme are compared first. 
tJ sing the derivatives in ( 13 ), note that 
TC* ( 7T.4 77'4 ) TC* ( 1 1 l 0 {"] {.2 , ,. TA -TA., = f --·-~-. dTC = f ·-------- d7C. 
I - () ore cffC (I C* £(CIB=B*) ( 14) 
!low the correlation betv•een Band C' affects this difference is illustrated in the two panels of 
Suppose first that B and C are uncorrelated. Then £( Ci B = B*) = [, where C is the 
unconditional mean of C. When TC* is the lowest level needed to purchase a single tract of land. 
C '*is the lowest cost for an available tract of land. At this low cost, let R equal the integrand in 
( 14 ). R is positive unless Band C arc perfectly negatively correlated. in which case R o= 0. Let 
R' equal the integrand in (14) when TC* = TC0 . At TC0, C * is the highest cost tract of land and 
R' is negative. Rand R' are shown in the top panel of Figure 3. Consider what happens to the 
integrand at the two cost extremes when Band Care negatively conelated. At the low cost 
extreme E(C!B = B*) < [. At TC* = TC0 , E(CIB = B*) >C. That is, negative correlation 
rotates the RR' curve in Figure 3 in a counterclockwise direction to the new curve SS'. 
Similarly. a positive correlation results in a clocbvise rotation from RR' to IT in Figure 3. 
The three curves in the top portion ofF igure 3 are the integrand in (14) under the three 
correlation scenarios assuming a single crossing as TC* increases. Linearity is assumed for 
expositional purposes only. As shown in the bottom portion of Figure 3. the difference between 
TA 1 and TA 7 is maximized where the curves in the top panel intercept the horizontal axis. A 
single crossing is a sufficient condition for a monotonic relationship between the degree of 
1 /C*-1 /E(CIB=B*) 
T 
14 
Positive correlation 
R No correlation 
s 
Positive correlation 
No correlation 
Negative correlation 
TC* 
Negative correlation S' 
R' 
T' 
~-------------------------------------------------TC* 
Figure 3. The effect of correlated Band Con the acreage cost of environmental targeting 
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correlation and T~1 1 - 7~12 because TA 1(TC0 )- TA 2 (TC0 ) = Ofor all correlation coefficients 
(Rothchild and Stiglitz). With a single crossing. the more positively correlated 13 and C arc. the 
greater the difference in acreage outcomes from targeting. The intuition behind this result is 
straightforward. Positive correlation between Band C implies that. on average. CRP acreage that 
offers large targeted benefits also costs more to enroll. Thus. on average under positive 
correlation. vvhen the C-ranking scheme is accepting lov,:-cost acreage. the B-ranking scheme 1s 
accepting high-cost acreage, and the size of CRP under the tvvo schemes is likely to differ by a 
large amount. Negative correlation between C and B makes the two ranking schemes more 
consistent because, on average, the low-cost acreage will also yield the highest benefits. So 
\\hen ('-ranking is enrolling lovv-cost land. B-ranking is enrolling the same land because of its 
high B-value. 
A similar result can be developed for an increase in the variability of C holding (·· 
constant. When Band Care uncorrelated. a small variability inC implies that the integrand in 
(14) is relatively small for all TC*. An increase in variability that affects all values of(' 
increases (decreases) the integrand for low (high) values of TC* Such a rotation is similar to the 
rotation from RR' to TT' in Figure 3, ·which results in an increase in the difference between the 
tvvo acreage outcomes. When Band (·are positively correlated. an increase in variability also 
mcrcases the difference in acreage outcomes but. as is shown for the bivariate normal 
distribution. a negative correlation will ameliorate some of the increase. Increasing the 
\'ariahility of 13 that does not alter the B-ranking will not affect TA 1 - 7~42 because neither C* nor 
nCB*) \vill change. 
16 
0low consider how aggregate benefits under the C-ranking scheme and the 13-ranking 
scheme differ. Using the derivatives in (13), 
TB -TB" = rJc•(lTBI -- i!JB2. \iTC=rfc*(E(BIC=C*) ___ B* ~Jdrc·. (15) 
I ~ () r:'JC r:'JC) 0 C* E(CIB = B*) 
First note that Proposition 1 does not establish the sign of (15), even though we might 
assume that targeting B should result in greater total benefits. To sec \Vhy this result cannot he 
established in generaL note that the integrand of ( 15) for uncorrelated B and C becomes 
/3 B * h. . . . h -C-; B * C'* 0 C .d h . f' I . 
--- - --=-. T IS expresston Is negat1ve w en B . - < . onst er t e s1gn o t 11s ( '* c 
c;,:pression for low values of TC*. Holding B and C constant, if the range of B relative to the 
range of Cis large. then it is likely that BC < B * C *. However, if the range of B is small 
relative to the range of C, then the integrand is likely to be positive for low values of TC*. If the 
integrand of (15) is negative for low values of TC* and there is a monotonic relationship between 
the integrand and TC*, then TB1 - TB2 < 0 for all TC* 
Now it is relatively simple to shO\v \Vhat happens to the difference in benefits as the 
variability of Band C changes. When Band Care uncorrelated and TC* is small, increasing the 
variability of C will not affect B*, but C* will decrease, thus increasing the integrand in (15). If 
7131 - T/32 < 0. then this increase in variability lessens the difference (makes it less negative). If 
T!31 - TB2 > 0. then this increase in variability increases the difference. Conversely, increasing 
the\ ariability of B will decrease the integrand in (15) for a low TC*. and hence, will tend to 
mcrease the difference if TB1 - TB2 < 0 (make it more negative). If TB1 - TB2 > 0, then an 
mcrease in variability of B will tend to decrease the difference. As is shown for the special case 
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of a bivariate normal distribution, making B and C correlated will not affect the direction of 
change from increases in variability, but it will affect the magnitude of change. 
Flow an increase in the correlation between Band C affects TB1 - TB2 can be seen by 
noting that ECCIB = B*) for lmv TC* increases \vith an increase in correlation (more positive or 
less negative) and thatE(BjC = C*) decreases with an increase in correlation. Thus both terms in 
the integrand of ( 15) decrease as the correlation betv,'Cen Band C increase and the net effect on 
the difference in total benefits is ambiguous. 
Deriving analytical results when marginal costs are targeted is much more difficult 
because of the complexity of the joint distribution of C and the ratio CIB. However, some insight 
can be obtained by noting when C and Bare negatively correlated, C and C/B are positively 
correlated. This positive correlation is a result of two factors. First the ratio varies directly with 
(' because Cis the numerator. This direct relationship is reinforced by the negative correlation 
because when the ratio's numerator is large. the denominator is, on average, small. Thus. the 
more negatively correlated Band Care, the less conflict there is between C-ranking and 
B-ranking. And because there is an ambiguous effect of correlation on TB1 - TB2 , one would 
expect this result to carry over to the case of C/B-ranking. 
As illustrated in Figure 3. a positive correlation between Band C increases the trade-off's 
that must be made when moving from C-ranking to B-ranking. But a positive correlation 
hetv,een 13 and C ·does not necessarily imply large conflicts between C-ranking and CIB ranking. 
\Vith a positive correlation. high (low) drmvs of C tend to increase (decrease) the ratio CIB 
because ( · appears in the numerator. But on average, high (low) draws of C imply high (low) 
drav,s of B and tends to increase (decrease) the denominator. The indirect eflect from correlation 
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works against the direct effect thus making it difficult to derive any general statement about the 
magnitude of change as correlation increases. HO\vever, it is clear that there will be less conf1ict 
between C-ranking and CIB ranking under a positive correlation than bet\vccn C- and B-rankmg. 
Additional insight into the trade-oils involved as one moves away from (_'-ranking can be 
obtained by assuming that C and B arc bivariate normal random variables with means c·· and 7J, 
variances a; and a~, and correlation coefficient y. The results under this assumption are 
presented below. Derivation of these results are also provided in Appendix i\. 
c(TA1 -TA2 ) 
or 
a 1 13*-B 0 EfC B = B*) rp(--;;;-)? . 
where <p (•) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
(16) 
Equation (16) is a formal statement of the result illustrated in Figure 3 that the more positive 
the correlation between B and Cis the greater the change in total acreage when moving away 
from C-ranking. 
o(TA1 - TA2) 1 C * -C y B * -B ~~--=~rp( )+-----~-rp(~-). 
oa 1 C* o- 1 E(C1 B = B*) a 2 
( 17) 
When y? 0, (16) is a restatement of the previously developed result that increases in the 
variability of C ·will increase the change in acreage vvhen moving away from C-ranking. Note 
that a negative y decreases the effect of a change in variance. whereas a positive y increases the 
effects of ,-ariancc. In fact it cannot be shown in general that (17) is positive because an increase 
in o- 1 \Vhen y is negative increases both TA 1 and 7~42 , although (17) is nonnegative when y = -I 
and when y = 0. 
o(TA1 - TA)) = O. 
00, 
(18) 
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Increases in 0 2 do not affect TA 1 because C-ranking ignores B. Also, changes in 0 2 do not affect 
TA 2 because the ranking and expected cost remain unchanged vvith increases in the variance of 
benefits. 
o(TBJ-TBJ) C*-C. B*CT 1 B*-B 
----=-CTo(/J( )+ . rp(--~j. 
oy - CJ 1 E(CIB=B*) CT 2 
( 19) 
As discussed above. the effect of increases in yon the difference in benefits received cannot be 
signed because the two effects of y work in opposition to each other. 
E(BIC=C*) C*-C. B*y B*-B. 
----rp( ) + m( ). 
C* CTI E(C!B=B*)y~ ()2 (20) 
When y 2 0. increases in the variability of C increase TB1 - TB2 . Decreases in the correlation 
cocf'ficient decrease the magnitude ofthe variance effect. And. as with (17). when y < 0 it is not 
possible to sign (20). 
NTBJ-TR) C*-C. B*-B ---~ = -rrp(---J -rp(-~-J. 
OCT2 CTI CT2 
( 21) 
Equation (21) is the analogous result to (20). Note that increases in the correlation coetlicient 
increase the impact of changes in the variability of benefits and that (21) cannot be signed vvhen y 
< 0. 
Data and Estimation 
Correlation and Variability Estimation 
Estimation of the variability of B and C and the correlation between the two is crucial to 
determining the extent to which movement away from C-ranking (acreage maximization) affects 
the performance of CRP. Ideally, data measuring accepted CRP bids and attributes of specific 
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tracts of current CRP lands \Vould be used. With these data the critical relationships could be 
determined by calculating the sample covariance matrix. The problem with implementing this 
procedure is that data measuring both the site-specific environmental attributes and the accepted 
rental rate bids of CRP land are not available in the same data set. 
The approach in this study relates the 1992 National Resources Inventory (NRI), 
compiled by the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), \vith the county-le\'el average CRP summary 
tile for acres enrolled through the eleventh sign-up. These data were compiled by the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) to examine the correlation between 
CRP bid statistics and the environmental characteristics ofthe enrolled land. The 1992 NRI is 
the latest in a series of inventories conducted by SCS and USDA. The NRI provides information 
on the status, condition, and trends of land, soil, water. and related resources on private U.S. 
land. The 1992 NRI is unique in that it is the first attempt to associate a randomly drawn sample 
of geographically based primary sampling units (PSUs) with both physical resource 
characteristics and the CRP participation information and has 5- to 1 0-year trends for natural 
resources and cropping history. The 1992 NRI is an extensive inventory that covers about 
800.000 sample points representing 75 percent of U.S. land area. Sample locations for the NRI 
\\ere chosen using a two-stage. stratified. area sampling scheme. Two-stage area samples were 
selected within each stratum. The first-stage sample unit (PSU) was an area of land, and the 
second stage contains one or more points within each PSU (Goebel, Riser. and Hickman 1982). 
The expansion factor associated with each PSU provides natural aggregation to the county. state. 
and national levels. 
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A sample of site-specific environmental attributes of CRP lands are available using the 
NRI-92 database. But this database does not include the CRP rental rate because of privacy 
concerns. Only county-average rental rates are available. County-average rental rates equal site-
specific rental rates if land is homogeneous or if the CRP auction design resulted in a single price 
being paid for all CRP tracts in a county. There clearly is a large degree of variation in CRP land 
quality within many counties. so the first condition is not met for these counties. But. as pointed 
l)Ut by Taff and Runge (1988), USDA decided to set an upper limit on CRP bids in the early and 
middle rounds of bidding. As these caps became widely known, CRP bids within a county 
converged to the cap. Thus, county average bids during these sign-up periods serve as a good 
prox_y for the site-specific bids. The degree of correlation between Band Cis measured by the 
sample correlation matrix between county average bids and site-specific environmental factors. 
The simplest way of determining the extent of variability of environmental benefits is to 
estimate Lorenz curves (figure 4 ). The vertical axis measures the percentage of total 
environmental benefits. The horizontal axis measures the percentage ofland enrolled in a 
targeted CRP. A 45-degree line implies a uniform distribution of environmental benefits. The 
greater the concavity of the curve, the greater the concentration of environmental benefits and the 
greater the environmental gains from environmental targeting. 
Bias in Estimating the Effects of Targeting 
County·-average rental rates are unbiased estimates of the tract-specific rental rates. Thus, 
when the tract-specific environmental attributes are used to rank CRP tracts, as is done with B-
ranking. the estimated budget costs of different enrollment levels are unbiased. However, the 
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100% 
100% % Land Enrolled 
Figure 4. Measuring the concentration of environmental benefits with a Lorenz curw 
lack of information about tract-specific CRP bids can bias the estimated impacts of the other two 
targeting schemes because use of county-average rental rates underestimates the variability of C · 
and hence the ratio C/B. Consider the C-ranking scheme. Because land is accepted according to 
the bid level. increases in the variance of bids, holding the mean constant, increases the number 
of acres that can be purchased, because there are more '·Jow" bid draws. Similarly. an increasing 
variance inC leads to an increased variance inC/B. which would allov,; additional acreage (and 
environmental benefits) to be purchased. Thus. use of county-average bids underestimates the 
amount of acreage and environmental benefits that could be purchased with these two schemes. 
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Results 
The critical factors that determine the extent to which targeting increases the efficiency 
\\ith \vhich environmental attributes of CRP land arc purchased are the degree of correlation 
between Band C and the amount of variability in Band C Figure 5 presents the sample 
correlation coefficients and Figure 6 presents Lorenz curves that measure hovv uniformly the 
various target indicators, including the multiple index, arc distributed over current CRP lands. 
Wind erosion is negatively correlated with cost which implies that moving mvay from acreage 
targeting (C-ranking) to targeting wind erosion should not greatly decrease the size of CRP for 
given budget outlays. When acreage targeting is enrolling low-cost land, environmental 
targeting based on wind erosion is also targeting the same land. Conversely, the \Vater erosion, 
surface vvater quality, wildlife habitat and the sum of all indicators (multiple index) are 
positively correlated with B. which implies that low-cost land offers, on average, low values for 
these indicators. Based solely on the correlation coefficient, we might conclude that moving 
away from acreage targeting would have a relatively large effect on CRP size and the amount of 
environmental attribute offered. The groundwater vulnerability index is essentially uncorrelated 
with cost. 
As indicated by Figure 6. the distribution of benefits varies widely across the indicators. 
The most concentrated indicator is surface water quality: more than 98 percent of total surface 
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water quality benefits on current CRP land arc obtained by enrolling less than 27 percent of CRP 
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Figure 5 _ Correlation between CRP rent and the target indicator 
_D D 
WU! Multiple 
land. Wind erosion and groundv,;ater vulnerability are also fairly concentrated: enrollment of 32 
percent of CRP land achieves about 90 percent of the total benefits from the two indicators 
Water erosion is slightly less concentrated. To achieve 90 percent of the total water erosion 
benefits. nearly 43 percent of current CRP land has to be renewed. The wildlife habitat and the 
multiple index arc the nwst uniformly distributed. 
Combining the correlation and concentration estimates, we might expect that moving 
;ma\ from C-ranking (acreage targeting) would have the largest effects on surface water quality 
and \Vater erosion because these indicators are positively correlated with cost and are highly 
concentrated. Because \Vind erosion is negatively correlated with cost and is also highly 
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l igure 6. Trade-oils between environmental efticiency and CRP acres 
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concentrated. we might expect that acreage targeting does a fairly good job of achieving wind 
erosion benefits. 
To better understand the magnitude of these trade-otis and to determine the extent to 
\vhich environmental and economic gains can be obtained from targeting, we examine the overall 
cost and environmental implications of targeted renewal of current CRP land under alternative 
policy scenarios. In the absence of policy guidelines for the future of the CRP program we 
analyzed four different scenarios. based on CRP fiscal spending limits of $250 million, $500 
million. $750 million. and $1 billion for each target indicator. These upper limits translate into 
15. 30. 45. and 60 percent renewal ofCRP outlay for the contracts entered through the eleventh 
sign-up. Tables 2 and 3 present the empirical results for our three targeting schemes: acreage 
targeting ( C ·-ranking). environmental benefits targeting (B-ranking), and maximizing of 
environmental benefits (CIB ranking). The B-ranking and C/B-ranking were calculated for the 
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multiple index and also for individual environmental indicators: water erosion, wind erosion, 
groundv,:ater vulnerability, surface water quality, and wildlife habitat. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the number of acres enrolled, the proportion of CRP land renewed, 
the average rental rate paid for the enrolled acreage, and the total budget exposure under the three 
schemes. Table 2 presents the results for the multiple index and for acreage maximization. 
Table 3 presents the results for the individual environmental attributes. 
The results in Table 2 indicate the degree to which moving away from acreage targeting 
to environmental targeting increases environmental benefits from targeting and the trade-off with 
regard to the number of acres enrolled. For example, at $500 million, acreage targeting achieves 
only 21.5 percent of potential water erosion benefits of CRP, 37.6 percent of groundwater 
vulnerability benefits, 16 percent of surface \Vater quality and wildlife habitat benefits, and about 
31 percent of multiple environmental benefits. In contrast, targeting the multiple index almost 
doubles each of the indicators, except for wind erosion benefits. The trade-off for higher 
environmental benefit is a 10 percent reduction in CRP size. There is little difference in wind 
erosion benefits among these three targeting schemes because of the negative correlation 
between bid rate and \Vind erosion. Almost 69 percent of wind erosion benefits at the $500 
million level are from maximizing CRP size. The C/B-ranking gains 58 percent ofthe multiple 
environmental benefits, only about two percentage points more benefits than can be achieved by 
B-ranking. and enrolls 32 percent of CRP lands. Furthermore, C/B-ranking gains larger wind 
erosion and vvildlifc habitat benefits and smaller water erosion and groundwater benefits 
compared to purely B-ranking. 
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Figure 7. Environmental efficiency of the three ranking schemes: C-. B-. and C/B-ranking 
Figure 7 compares the environmental benefits under these three alternative schemes for 
two budget constraints: $250 million and $1 billion. Two key observations can be made. First. 
with only $250 million to spend. a significant portion of environmental benefits can be achieved 
hy targeting. Second. more than 75 percent ofthe environmental benefits can be achieved by 
renewing only 50 to 60 percent of current CRP contracts. The policymaker can redirect the 
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remaining 40 to 50 percent of the current annual CRP budget (assuming that Congress will 
approve I 00 percent of the budget) to enroll ne\v land that is environmentally sensitive. 
Results from targeting the five environmental indicators independently under the two 
alternative schemes (B-and C/B-ranking) are presented in Table 3. The environmental efficiency 
of these targeting schemes is estimated both by the levels of the target indicator and the level of 
multiple index. The correlation bet\veen the environmental attribute and the bid level plays an 
1111portant role in determining the number of acres that can be enrolled under the different 
options. For example, under a $500 million program selecting land based solely on water 
erosion benefits (water erosion benefits ranking), w·hich is positively correlated with cost will 
reduce CRP size from 13 million acres under C-ranking to about 9.3 million acres. But when 
wind erosion is targeted, it is negatively correlated with bids, so the program size is reduced by 
one million acres. despite the greater concentration of wind erosive lands relative to water 
eroSIVe. 
Hmv the average bid changes as more land is enrolled indicates whether the sign and 
magnitude of the correlation between C and B changes as enrollment increases. These estimates 
are illustrated in Figure 8. For water erosion and surface water quality, the average bid 
monotonically decreases. suggesting that the correlation remains positive. For wind erosion. the 
average bid monotonically increases as enrollment increases, suggesting that the correlation 
remains negative. Hmvevcr, the correlation coefficient for the groundwater vulnerability index is 
first negative. and then becomes positive. and the correlation coefficient for wildlife habitat is 
first positive (since riparian land, which is more expensive. is enrolled first), and then becomes 
negative as more grassland is enrolled. 
32 
fj~ ·------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
II In d :.:: OSIOn 
·1::; '!:-:--- - - - -- - - - . -- - - - - - - ---- ------- ------- --- -- - --- --------- --- - - ------- - . - - -- - - - ---- --- - - - ---- -- - - - - ---
26 2B 
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Figure 8. Average rent under selected environmental ranking 
rable 3, column titled Level of Target Indicator, lists the percentage of the total benefits from 
targeting a given indicator. What is striking is that maximization of environmental benefits by 
enrolling land according to low values of the CIB ratio leads to essentially the same level of 
environmental benefits as does enrolling land according to high B values. Perhaps this should 
not he too surprising given the degree of concentration of many of the indicators: if v;e \Vant to 
purchase environmental quality, we should seek land with significant environmental amenities. 
In addition. use of county-average bids underestimates the environmental benefits that can be 
deri\·ed from C/B-ranking. The largest difference between the two targeting schemes is for the 
wildlife habitat indicator. As diagramed in Figure 6. this is the most uniformly distributed 
indicator. Marginal cost targeting thus allows more choice of where to purchase the 
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environmental amenity. Again. these results indicate that the more the attribute is concentrated 
and negatively correlated. the greater the proportion of the total attribute obtained at the various 
funding levels. For example. 80.4 percent of potential water erosion in CRP land can he 
eliminated at just 30 percent of current expenditures ($500 million). But. for the negatively 
correlated \vind erosion, 94.2 percent of wind erosion can be eliminated at 30 percent of current 
cost. Almost l 00 percent of benefits from the surface water quality index and 91 percent of the 
land n1lncrable to pesticide leaching can be purchased \vith $500 million funding. But if wildlife 
habitat is targeted, $500 million buys ju~.t 43 to 50 percent of total benefits, as measured by our 
\vildlife habitat index that depends on B-ranking or C/B-ranking. 
The last two columns of Table 3 shows the percentage of the multiple index that can be 
obtained by targeting individual environmental attributes. The more the individual targets are 
positively correlated vvith the multiple index. the greater the percentage of multiple index. 
Surface vvater quality and wildlife habitat indexes are most correlated with the multiple index 
The correlation coefficients arc 0.89 and 0.92. At the $500 million budget constraint, 32 percent 
of potential multiple benefits are achieved if surface \Vater quality and wildlife habitat benefits 
are maximized. Of course, policymakers may assign far different weights when constructing 
their own indicator of multiple environmental benefits, which could greatly modify the 
environmental benefits from these targeting schemes. Figure 9 traces the Lorenz curve for the 
multiple index benefits under B-ranking. which maximizes benefits from each of the 
em ironmental indicators. 
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Figure 9. Trade-offs bet1-vecn environmental efficiency and CRP acreage 
(Efficiency is measured by the level of the multiple index) 
0.8 0.9 
Appendix D maps show the county-level distribution of CRP at the $250 million budget level. 
There are clear distributional implications ofthe various targeting schemes. Wind erosion 
targeting and \vildlife targeting result in land concentrated in the Great Plains. Water erosion 
targeting results in concentration in the Mississippi and Missouri River valleys, as does surface 
water quality. Targeting for ground\vater vulnerability results in concentration in the High Plains 
region overlying the Ogallala aquifer. 
!'he preceding analysis estimates the tradcoffs involved from targeting different 
environmental objectives for land that is currently enrolled in CRP. One important point that the 
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focus on current CRP land neglects is the proportion of environmentally sensitive U.S. lands that 
are currently enrolled in CRP. For example. if only a small fraction of lands vulnerable to 
ground\vater contamination arc currently enrolled in CRP, does it make sense to target this 
emironmcntal indicator at the expense of others? Perhaps so, if the marginal social benefits 
from enrolling these lands decrease at a significant rate. But if the marginal benefits are constant 
or decrease slowly, then the payoff from enrolling these lands is likely lmv. If, on the other hand, 
a large portion of environmentally sensitive lands are enrolled, then it is more justifiable to target 
sue h 1 ands because a significant portion of the total land available can be o btaincd. This is 
particularly true if marginal payoffs are constant or decrease slowly. 
For this paper's indicators, the proportion of groundwater sensitive lands and lands that 
offer wildlife benefits that arc currently in CRP is quite low because of the way that these two 
indexes are defined. Groundwater vulnerability is highest on lands that grow crops that usc a lot 
of fertilizer and pesticides, such as corn, soybeans, wheat and cotton. CRP does not and never 
\vill. enroll a significant proportion of lands that grow these crops. Furthermore, there is no 
reason to believe that marginal benefits decline rapidly from enrolling more groundwater 
vulnerable lands And our wildlife index is constructed such that all nonriparian land west of the 
~v1ississippi provides equal wildlife habitat Thus. a small proportion of wildlife habitat will ever 
he enrolled in CRP. But it still might make sense to target wildlife habitat because the marginal 
returns to \Vildlife habitat west of the 0.1ississippi might decline fairly rapidly. That is, there are 
likely very large payoffs from converting riparian lands and some grasslands from agriculture 
uses But, additional grasslands are likely to have significantly lower values because society 
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generally places a large weight on saving species and much lower weight on expanding 
populations of nonthreatened species. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the amount of croplands that has wind or water erosion rates 
greater than 20 tons per acre (Table 4), that is within 100 feet of a surface \Vater body (Table 5). 
and that has a high risk of groundwater vulnerability. The fraction of total U.S. cropland meeting 
these criteria can be calculated by comparing these estimates with the amount of CRP land 
meeting these criteria reported in Tables B.1. to 8.4. USDA did a surprisingly good job 
enrolling land subject to water erosion rates greater than 20 tons per acre. CRP contains 68 
percent of total U.S. cropland that has water erosion rates 20 tons or greater. In the Northern and 
Southern Great Plains, fully 90 percent of cropland with erosion rates greater than 20 tons is 
enrolled in CRP. But in the Corn Belt only 40 percent cropland with this erosion rate is enrolled. 
Thus, if reducing water erosion is a top priority, then targeting existing CRP land will be 
productive at achieving significant national benefits. If additional highly erosive land in the Corn 
Belt is desired. it is available, but it will be expensive. As indicated in the fifth column of Table 
4. the average cost of these lands, as estimated by the county-average CRP rental rates is more 
than $76/ac. which is substantially greater than land in the Great Plains. 
Currently, CRP land contains 33 percent of the nation's cropland that has wind erosion 
rates greater than 20 tons per acre and about 7 percent of the land \Vi thin 100 feet of a surface 
water body. The \vind erosion estimate suggest that targeting wind erosive cropland would 
achie\'e signiticant national benefits. And. ifthe marginal social benefit from retiring cropland 
close to surface \Vater bodies is quite high. then targeting these lands would also result in 
significant social benefits. 
Table 4. Highly erodible non-CRP cropland and the cost of enrollment under CRP 
-~~----- -----~--- --------~-------
USDA Region Cropland with >20 tons water erosion per acre Cropland with >21l tons wind erosion per acre 
acres percent cost, dollars percent Rent. S/acn.: acres percent cost. dollars percent Rent. S/acre 
Northeast J+S,WO '). J,(l 20.403,fl') I 4.R4 'iSS\ () ll. ()() 0 0. 00 NA 
Appalachian I ,086,200 16.(19 5'i,092,56S n.o6 50.72 I .ROO 0.02 I OC1,04 7 0.03 58.92 
Southeast 278,40() 4.28 11.952,04'i 2.83 42.93 0 0.00 0 (UJU NA 
Delta States 21 1.20() 3.24 9,U2,5S9 2.16 43.24 () (). 00 0 (). ()() NA 
Com Belt 2,l)l)'))\()() 4Cl.m 229 ,(J_\(),5 32 54.44 76.6-'i 8,400 0.09 758,110 0.21 90.25 
Lake States 442,700 6.80 30.369,637 7.20 68.60 656,SOO 7.28 31.775,X'l8 8.67 48.38 
N. Plains 676,700 I 0 40 43,649,103 10.35 64.'i0 530,400 5.88 22,854,740 6.24 43.09 
S. Plains ~n AOO 1.28 2.803J37 (),(J(J 33.6I 4,136,700 45.84 170,473,971 46.52 41.2I 
Mountain 131,700 2.05 :U58,450 1.17 43.07 3.294,400 36.50 121 ,66'i,425 33.20 16.93 
Pacific 252.200 3.87 13,05 l.l20 3. ()9 'i 1.7-'i 396,300 4.39 18,809,636 5.13 47.46 
National 6,-'iOR, 900 100 421,849,032 IOO 64.8I 9,024,800 100 :lClo,443,767 100 40.60 
Note: Cost is imputed from county level average hid price of current CRP contracts. 
Table 5. Non-CRP cropland affecting surface water and groundwater quality the most and the cost of enrollment under CRP 
USDA Region Cropland within 100 feet of surface water hody Cropl<md with high groundwater vulnerahility risk 
acres percent cost, dollars percent Rent, S/acre acres percent cost, dollars perCl:nt Rent, S/acre 
Northeast 490,1 ()() 9.02 2.4,685,43S S,62 50.37 0 0.00 () 0.00 NA 
Appalachian 761,100 14.00 32,R'i5, I 79 I 1.47 43. I7 0 0.00 () Cl.OO NA 
Southe;L~t 404,9()() 7.45 6,885,770 2.40 17.01 () 0.()0 () ().()() NA 
Delta States 525,30() 9.67 20,050,076 7.00 38.!7 604 .ROO 1.36 2Sj99.427 1.24 47.29 
Corn Belt !.4Cll ,'iOO 26.R9 I I0220,657 3 8.49 75.42 6J\R9, I 00 15.45 495,I83, l6R 21.42 71.88 
Lake States (150.400 11.97 41,793,009 14.59 64.26 29 1 ,300 0.65 19,997.309 cun (JS.6"i 
N. Plains 336,40() 6.19 19.096,54 I 6.67 '.6.77 15,925,000 :15.72 921,835,266 39 .RR '.7.R9 
S. Plains 216,500 3.9R R,'i00,296 2.97 \9.2() 9.95S.900 22.34 J97,9nUII 17 22 39.96 
Mountain 2R"i.500 5.25 10,22-'i, 169 ).57 l'..S I 4.94 7 ,00() 11.10 I R9Jo\AS9 S.i9 \8.28 
Pacific 10.\JOO 'i.SR 12.07R,I5R 4.2::'. l9.82 'i .960, 700 I3.37 258.485.149 ILlS 43.36 
National 5.435,000 100 286,390,293 !()() 'i2.69 445711,800 100 2J11.442,!19 100 51.85 
.. 
Note: Cost is imputed from county level average bid price uf curn:nf CR P con tracts 
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As can be calculated from Tables 5 and 8.4, CRP currently has 11 percent of cropland 
rated as having a high risk of contaminating groundwater. Thus, unless the marginal benefit from 
retiring these lands is initially very large and declines rapidly, significant groundwater benefits 
may not be obtai ned from targeting this environmental indicator. If marginal beneti ts arc fairly 
constant. then a less costly program may be to induce farmers to alter their production practices 
so that nutrients and pesticides arc used more efficiently. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study estimates the trade-offs from three CRP targeting options for renewal of CRP 
contracts. The three options are (1) CRP acreage maximization, (2) enrolling land solely on the 
level of environmental benefits offered, and (3) maximizing environmental benefits offered by 
CRP We provide estimates of the trade-offs between the number of acres enrolled in CRP and 
the level of specific environmental benefits from targeting environmental attributes for various 
limits on annual government expenditures. Estimates of these trade-offs are made for the 
environmental targets of water erosion, wind erosion. surface \Vater quality. groundwater 
vulnerability to pesticides, \vildlife habitat, and a simple average ofthe five individual targets. 
The degree to \vhich environmental targeting conflicts with an objective of maximizing CRP size 
is shmvn to depend on the degree of negative correlation between rental rates and the level of 
environmental attribute offered by individual tracts of CRP land and on the degree of 
concentration of the environmental targets. 
This study reports outcomes for the simple average weighting schemes and weighting 
schemes that assign a weight of one to individual targets and zero weights to all others. It should 
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he noted that a weighting scheme other than a simple linear average weighting scheme will yield 
different results. Without knowing policymakers' level preferences on these individual 
environmental indicators. the best approach is a simple average multiple index. Because of 
spatial heterogeneity in the importance ofthese environmental indicators (that is. the sensitivity 
of these indicators varies with the underlying site-specific physical characteristics). it is difficult 
to develop a defensible multiple index that could be applied uniformly to all regions of the 
{ nited States. So it is important to perform sensitivity analyses of alternatively constructed 
multiple indexes. With this note of caution, \Ve highlight the two key findings of this analysis. 
I· i rst. under a smaller and tighter CRP renewal program, it pays to target the environmental 
indicators. Second, by renewing only 50 to 60 percent ofthe current CRP land. nearly 75 percent 
ofthe environmental benefits can be purchased by targeting. The remaining CRP fiscal 
resources could be used to purchase environmental benefits from new land that is 
environmentally sensitive. 
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Appendix A. Mathematical Proofs 
A. Proof of Proposition I 
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B. Derivation of the hivariatc normal results (16) through (21) 
Let s1 (C) and s2 (B) denote the marginal density functions of C and B. Under the assumption of normality 
I B-B 
.\2 (B)= -~rp(--), 
(]"2 (]", 
where (p(-) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. The sizes ofCRP under acreage and 
environmental targeting can be rewritten as 
and 
where <DC) is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
Similarly. the total environmental benefits under the two targeting schemes can be rewritten as 
C '* -+-<tJ C* -t-<1) 
TB1 = f fs(C,B)BdBdC= f s1(C) f s(C,~) BdBdC = 
.1 1 (C) 
-ce --r. -=o -'l) 
+x ¥.J: +-oc 
f f f 
1 B-B 
TB2 = s(C, B)BdBdC = ~-rp(--)BdB = 
u, (]"2 
f3* -OC· [3• ~ 
The total C:RP payment under the acreage targeting can be rewritten as 
C* -
- - C*-C C*-C 
TC* c~ f s 1 (C'f._'dC = C<D(~-)-u 1 cp(-~-). 
0"1 (J"l 
-cr 
(A I) 
(1\.2) 
(A.5) 
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Differentiating (A.5) with respect to CJI, CT2 , andy gives 
r!C * C*-C ~~ ?C* ac * 
-- ----
--
~ 0, -- ~ () (A 6) 
DCJI CJI C* i"'CT~ Dr 
The total CRP payment under the environmental targeting can be written as 
+x tXJ tx +x ·(C B) 
Tc* ~ f j s(C. BJCdBdC = J 1·1 (B) i .s ' ~c/Bc/C 
-cx: B * B * - ~x; s2 (B) (A.7) 
~x I B-B. ~ al - B*-B ~. B*-L] 
- J --{p(--J[C +y(-)+(8-!JJ}dB=[l-clJ(---))C -y0 1<o(----) 3*02 02 02 02 a2 
Differentiating (A.7) with respect to CJI, CT 2 , andy gives 
DB* Y()2 
ao-I E(CiB = B*) 
?·B* B*-B as* o-Io-2 
r E(CIB = B*) 
(A.8) 
Differentiating the difference of equations (A.1) rrnd (A.2) with respect to o-I, CT 2 , and rand using 
equations (A.6) and (A.8) gives 
c(7>1I- TA 2 ) B* -B 1 cB* 
----'-=rp(--)-- CTI B*-B __ :_____ rp(--);:: 0, 
cr CT~ 02 c7 E(CjB=B*) CT2 
c(TAI-TA2; C*-C C*-C C*-C l cl'* B*-B l c~B* 
_ __._ _ __::_ =-rp(--J --,- + rp(--) --- + rp(--) -- = 
CCTI (JI ()I (JI (JI /hi CT2 CT2 (~(}I 
1 C * -C cl::~ * C * -C I B * -B c13 * 
--rp(--J(---,-)+-rp(--)-= 
(JI ()I (JI CTj ()2 ()2 C(TI 
C*-C r B*-B 
-~!)(--}+ rpf--). 
C* ()I E(CiB=B*) CT2 
iYTAI- TA,) B* -B B* -B B* -B I c13* 
---'--_.~,__ = -rp(--)--, + rp(--)-~ = 0. 
r':o-2 o-2 o-2 CT2 o-2 rb-2 
Similarly. differentiating the difference of equations (A,3) and (A.4) with respect to ()I, o-2 , andy and 
usmg equations (A 6) and (A.8) gives 
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C* CT] E(CI B= fl*) CTo 
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APPENDIX B. 
REGIONAL DiSTRIBUTION OF CRP LAND 

Table B.l. Distribution of CRP land hy pre- and ptlstenmllment sheet and rillntlSllllllcwl 
-----
lJSDA Rcf!ion Soil loss< ') tons/m: Soil loss 'i-10 tons/ac Soil loss I 0-20 tons/ac Soil loss 20-JU tons/ac Soil loss> )() tuns/ac 
Preenrollmt:'nt Sheet and Rill Erosion 
Acres ,., /( Acres ("/ ,, Acres 'ir ·\rca 'lr Area 'lr 
Northeast l)()() ().h.:\ 711.70() .1.~0 I O'i .400 0.59 165()() 0.17 () (). ()() 
Appalachian )()() 0.21 .:\.70() 0.23 300.400 2.10 406.50() 4.16 272.ROO 6.98 
Southeast () 0.00 7 6.600 1,.79 I ,2.:\ 7 .SOO 6.Y0 176,4()() 1.~() 21.600 0.55 
Delta States 5.900 4.20 !9fi,Cl00 l) .69 478,400 2.fi~ 375. ]()() .1.84 S6, 900 '! '17 "'--•"-"-
Com Belt 19 .~00 14.08 204JOO I 0. 1 0 2.9.11 .000 16.43 1.781.900 18.23 183 .50() 4.70 
Lake States I~.()()() 12.~() 123.200 6. ()0 2.015,200 11.29 561,800 ).7'i () 0.00 
N. Plains 7 6. 0()() 'i4.60 618,200 30.57 6,028,800 33.70 I ,622.000 16.61 4 77 ,4[)() 12.22 
S. Plains 18 ,Cl(}O 12.8() ~.000 0.40 rn.6oo l.R9 2.786.2()() 28.'i I I ,979,000 )0.66 
Mountain 8()() 0.57 448,)00 22.18 2.868,800 i(J.08 2.043, I 00 20.91 88'i,00() 22.66 
Pacific () (). ()() 2o.UOO 13.0'i 1,430.400 8.07 2.800 o.cn () ll.OO 
National 140,600 100 2,022,000 100 17,842,500 100 9,773,21HI 100 3,906,200 100 
(7<, of row total 0 6 SJ 29 12 
Postenrollment Sheet and Rill Erosion 
Northeast 201 j()() 0.61) () (). ()() () () () () () 0 
Appalachian I ,074,700 3.22 () ( ).()() () 0 () () () () 
Southc;L~t I ,'i22.1 00 4.'i7 () 0.00 () n () () () () 
Delta States 1.142JOO ~.43 u 0.00 () 0 () () () () 
Corn Belt :'\, 120,o'i00 lo'i.36 () () (}( l () () () () (l () 
Lake Statt:s 2.718.200 8.l'i () (). ()() {) () () () () () 
N. Plains 8.82.:\,200 26.47 () 0.( )() () () () u 0 () 
S. Plains 5.110.600 I'd.~ 18.200 'i 20 () () ll () () 0 
Mountain 'i.0 14.600 17.74 .13 1. ()()() lJ4.8() () () () () n 0 
Pacific I. 706,000 o'i.l2 () () ()() () () II () () 0 
National 33,334,700 100 349,800 1()0 0 () () () () 0.00 
% of row total 99 1 () () 0 
Nutt:: CRP enrollment through eleventh sign-up (end of llJ() I) is includt:d. 
Source: National Resources Inventory datahast:. USDA/SCS. IL)L)2 
Tahk B.2. DistrihutiOII of CRP land hy pre- and postcnrollment wind crosiun level 
---~--~-
lJSDA Region Soil loss< ') tons/ac Soil loss 'i- IO tons/ac Soil loss 111-211 tons/aL Soil loss 211- \0 tons/ac Soil loss> J() tons/ac 
Preenrollment \\'ind Erosion 
AnL~s (/ ,( Acres 'II Acrcs 'lr Area </, ,( ;\rca 'lr 
Northeast 2()J.'i()(l O.XX () ().( )() () (). ()() () ( ).( )() () 0. (}() 
Appalachian I Jl74.71Hl -IJJX () (). ()() () 0.00 () ( ).( )() () 0' ()() 
Southeast l.'i22. IOU 6.64 0 () .()() () () '()() () () '00 u () .()() 
Delta States l.l42J()() 4.YX () ()' 0() 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 O.CIO 
Corn Bclt 4,YX l,lJOO 21.72 11 v~oo 2.92 23j()() 0.61 2.300 0.1 'i 0 (). {)() 
Lake States 1.742.XOO 7.60 _\ lJ ,4()() X.l2 492,XOO 12.SO 137.10() X.97 \2.100 2.13 
N. Plains 'i,o90.100 24.XO l.'i4:UOO 40.00 1.154.200 29.99 237.000 l'i.'ill 199.400 13.22 
S. Plains 2,900.400 12.64 507 ,I 00 Ll.I4 61.5JOO 15.99 401,600 26.27 704.400 46.71 
Mountain 2,22'i.tl00 9. 70 1.202.700 31.17 1.5 I 2,000 39.29 740.900 4S.46 5o5.ooo 37.47 
Pacific 1.4'iS,900 6.36 17l)JOO 4.o'i 50,700 1.32 10.100 o.6o 7.000 0.4o 
National 22,940,300 lllO 3,858,800 100 3,848,500 1()() 1,529,000 100 1,507 '900 10() .00 
CJr1 of row total 68 11 11 5 4 
Postenrollment Wind Erosion 
Northeast 201.500 O.oS () () 0 () () () () (}.()() 
Appalachian [ .074.700 1.0 () IU'i () () 0 () () (). 00 
Southeast 1.522.1()() 5.11 0 () () () () 0 () (). 00 
Delta States l.l42JOO 3.X4 () () () () () () () 0.00 
Com Belt 5.119.500 16.9(1 1. ()()() 162 () 4.19 () 2.X6 0 0.16 
Lake States 2.677.500 R.o7 2R.700 v~s 12.000 3.22 0 4056 () 3.53 
N. Plains x.o62.1 oo 25.75 119,700 4l) .14 40JO() 37.27 Of)() l0.7 I .500 IS.fd 
S. Plains 4.SX4.9110 l'i.27 12R.400 17.04 'i'iJOO 6.01 J()J)()() 14.69 'i0.2()() 17067 
Mountain 'i.1X7.500 14.04 490.200 2o.2X 254.'\()() 46.54 )()j()() 4I.So X3.500 5'1<..75 
Pacific 1.6S'i .400 .'i.47 16.000 0.49 4.600 2.7o () .:; _r::! () 1.29 
National J2,J57 ,500 100 784,000 100 366,700 100 41,100 100 135,200 I 00.00 
% of row total 96 2 I () 0 
Note: CRP enrollment through eleventh sign-up (end of !9lJ I) i;. includcd. 
Source: National Resources lnvcntorv database. lJSDA/SCS. 1992. 
Tahk B .. l. Distrihii! i1 111 uf CR P land hy distance to sur fan~ water body 
USDA Region > 1/-lth of a mile I/X-l/4th of a mile l/16-l/Xth of a mik l/l::'-l/l6th of a mile < 1/l::'th of a mile 
:\ncs (/ 1( Anes 'l Acres C! I( Area 'lr Acres ('/ I( 
Nmtheast l I::'. \()() 0.49 fltUOO 1.21 22,4()() 0.9 -\,()()() (l.\9 2,'\00 o.o 1 
Appalachian 270 ,()()() l 17 \'\2.60() 7.06 2'\ l .1100 l O.OS 14 I,'\()() LUI 511.1\0tl 14.311 
Southe;Lq 7117}()() 3.42 lX Ll 00 7Nl 250,900 10.0'\ 711.700 7.62 2UOO 5.79 
Delta States 420,700 1.111 374.'\00 7.5 223,'\00 8.95 Y UIOO 8.S9 31,800 7.7R 
Corn Belt 2. 199)\()() 9.'i4 l .507 ,oOO .10.18 S70. LOU 34.S5 402. l 00 3S.96 145.900 3'\.67 
Lake States I.S37 .200 7.97 -l'i3.1 00 9.07 2'i'i,700 10.24 l I l ,oOO 10.81 60,ooo 14.82 
N. Plains o.Y09 .700 W.24 l .23\,500 24.o9 431.700 17.29 132, l ()() 12.S 57,200 13.99 
S. Plains 4.6tn,200 19.97 )1)5 .I()() 7.9 l I 04,300 4.18 I 8.200 1.76 S.500 2.08 
Mountain 'i.l\49,900 25.311 n7:iOO 4.75 So,oOO 3.47 'i2.200 5.06 20.000 4.S9 
Pacific l .577,300 6J\4 S0,7UO 1.62 35.000 1.4 11,200 1.09 I ,SOO 0.44 
National 24,627,SOO 1()0 5,076,000 100 2,532,000 100 1,043.400 [()() 41 o,soo I 00.00 
% of row total 73 15 s 3 
Source: National ResourLTS Inventory datab:L-;e USDA/SCS. 1992 
Table B.4. Distrihuti1m of CRP land by groundwater vulnerability risk classes 
USDA Region No risk Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Acres 'lr Acre~ '!\ Area 'h Acres <! ,,
Northeast 20 I.'\()() o.o2 0 () 0 () () o.o 
Appalachian I .07 4. 700 2.9S () 1.71 () 9.41 () 10.116 
Southeast l.'i22, I 00 4.'i4 () 1.63 () 1.7 () ll 61 
Delta States 1,()1\ !,()()() 2."io 57.700 12.12 2.400 27.12 I .200 LU:l 
Corn Belt U6'i.200 14.9 I 624.SOO 7.65 'i 1 l. I 00 24.911 197.4()() \2.53 
Lake States 2 .(JlJ(i..) ()0 11.16 I ()j()() X."i3 l) .200 _).Xl) 2.20() SAX 
N. Plains \.877 ,l)()() 2o.4S 927,900 2S. 16 I ,946, I 00 20.79 2.tl72J()() 11.43 
S. Plains 2.tn.\.2()() I 'i.61 1.271,70() 6.7\ 1.'\X'i.SUO 7.21 2\(),4()() 7.44 
1\1ountain I. \94 .XOO 19 241.60() 2\K\ 2. I 'ih.200 \57 ::'AS 1.600 1.7 
Pacific J()l) .SOU 'i. 14 12:'.9()() 9.6\ )()7 .700 1.1::' 7h2.6UU () 
National 17,956,500 100 3,262,1 (){) 10() 6,740,200 100 5,725,700 100 
% of row total 53 10 20 17 
Note: Groundwater vulnerability fllr pesticide lcachin_l! is based tlll _l!munthatcr \Uinerahility index developed by Kell(lgg et al. J 9tJ2. 

APPENDIX C. 
COUNTY-LEVEL DISTRIBUTION OF CRP LAND 
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Figure C.1. Percentage of CRP to total cropland, by county 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory {NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure C.2. Cost of CRP land rent, by county 
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Data Source: County-level CRP Enrollment Summary. ASCS, USDA. 
Rent ($/Acre) 
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Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure C.3. Water erosion rates for CRP land, by county 
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Data Source: County-level CRP Enrollment Summary. ASCS, USDA. 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure C.4. Wind erosion rates for CRP land, by county 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 

Figure C.5. Percentage of CRP land designated as wetlands 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure C.6. Percentage of CRP land less than 100 feet from water 
,o 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 

APPENDIX D. 
RESULTS FROM THE $250 MILLION PROGRAM 

Figure 0.1. CRP land renewed by acreage targeting, $250m program 
,o 
CRP land to total cropland (percentj 
Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA. Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure 0.2. CRP land renewed by water erosion targeting, 
$250m program 
CRP land to total cropland (percent) 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure 0.3. CRP land renewed by targeting wildlife habitat potential, 
$250m program 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure 0.4. 
,o 
CRP land renewed by targeting groundwater vulnerable areas, 
$250m program 
CRP land to total cropland (percent) 
Not Seiected 
0 to 1 13 
1 13 to 4 35 
4 35 to 13 94 
13 94 to 78 57 
Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 

Figure 0.5. CRP land renewed by targeting surface water quality index, 
$250m program 
,o 
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CRP land to total cropland (percent) 
p> 
Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 
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Figure 0.6. CRP land renewed by targeting multiple index, 
$250m program 
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Data Source: 1992 National Resource Inventory (NRI), USDA, Soil Conservation Service 
Map Source: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University 

ENDNOTES 
1. Allen ( 1993) classifies the majority of agricultural ecosystems suitable for wildlife habitat 
into t\vo broad groups, namely ( 1) the species suitable for agricultural landscapes which contain 
a high degree of interspersion between land use and vegetation associations and (2) the species 
indigenous to grassland ecosystems. 
2. Klingbel and Montgomery developed the LCC system for soil. Land classes 1 through 8 
denote the degree to \Vhich the factors such as erosion, climate, soil characteristics, and m01sture 
condition interfere with crop production. Land capability class 1 has no interference whereas 
LCC 8 has extensive problems. 
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